Exhibit 1357.

[Spanish. A.L.S. P.I.R., 2019.8 ]

In margin: No. 121. Stamp: Samar Regiment, Office of the Lieutenant Colonel - -2nd Battalion.

SEPTEMBER 3, 1901.

To the Colonel second in command:

In compliance with your communication number 157 of the 24th ultimo, regarding the manner of studying the best plan of making a decisive attack upon a smaller detachment [than my own], I have the honor to inform you as follows:

Yesterday about seven a.m. I took up the march personally with all the guerrillas of my battaliDn towards Kapatagan, in order to make a decisive attack on the detachment of the enemy in Quiabong.

On our arrival at Kapatagan at exactly twelve o'clock of the same day, I was obliged to recruit immediately some bolomen Df the said barrio, and during the day was able to gather more than 100 bolomen, my intention being to combine them with our force as instructed in your said communication.

At half past five on the same day, the entire force took up the march towards Quiabong, where there is a small detachment of the enemy, in order to make the attack at night, and when we were already near the town and on the point of placing the entire force on the site designated for the commencement of the attack, the bolomen began to run to the rear without any orders, instead of entering the town, as, being very cowardly, there is no commander who can control them; the guerrillas when they saw this action were obliged to retreat, without having had any success in entering the town.

Well, Colonel, there is nothing to be done with the bolo men which I have, here; they are of no use for fighting and it is impossible to comply with what you order, for this plan, as I had the honor of communicating to you in my communication No. 114 dated the 23rd ultimo, has already failed three times through the cowardice of the bolomen, who when they arrive in front of a detachment of the enemy disappear from the view of our guerrillas in a twinkling.

In order to be able to make an attack like that of Katubig last year, it is necessary, Colonel, that you secure in one of the towns on the coast on the other side, excepting Catubig, about 150 bolomen of the most decided and courageous character to cooperate with the infantry under my command, leaving to my care the best plan of attack when I have the bolomen referred to in this place; for I have observed that with the people here it is impossible to execute the plan we desire.

With regard to the reconcentration of all the guerrillas in order to make my battalion a flying column and beseige an enemy's detachment of smaller size, as you order, I believe, Colonel, that it is impossible to do so because we would in this manner do a reckless act, as we are already well surrounded in this place by the enemy, who occupies eight posts, namely, Catbalogan, Quiabong, Motiong, Kalanan, Calbiga, Villa Real, Santa Rita and Basey, these posts being at a distance of about one and a half hours from each other, and it being easy for one post to come to the assistance of the other. I mention the difficulties to you in order to prevent what might happen later in the event of a sudden attack upon the enemy, which can be effected only by one blow and not by a seige.

The four pesos and fifty cents which you state you send me in your said communication by Sergeant del Rosario, the balance due from the last account, has not been received in the office of the Lieutenant Colonel, nor has this sergeant delivered any other money.

I have the honor to communicate the foregoing to you for your information and consequent effects.

God preserve you many years.

CAMP OF CATBALOGAN, September 3, 1901.


Lieutenant Colonel.