HUGHES, MARCH 3, 1902
WASHINGTON, D. C., March 4, 1902.
The committee met at 10.30 o'clock a. m.
Present: Senators Lodge (chairman), Proctor, Beveridge, Rawlins, Culberson, and Patterson.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. ROBERT P. HUGHES—Continued.
The CHAIRMAN. General, please resume your statement.
POINTS IN SAMAR WHERE PEOPLE GATHERED.
General HUGHES. I find in looking over the record of yesterday's proceedings that in the minds of some of the members of the committee there would seem to be a misunderstanding; that they think the only point at which the people of Samar collected was between the
Hibitan and the Gandara. That is entirely a mistake. They were allowed to settle along the coast from Muao to La Granja; Lavezares; at the towns of Bobon, Catarman, Laguan, Palapay; on the east coast at Oraz, Borongan, Guiuan; on the southwest coast at Santa Rita, Villa Real and Catbalogan; and in the interior at Oquendo, Blanco Aurora, Tiveran, and possibly one or two others.
NUMBER OF PEOPLE SO GATHERED.
These concentrations, as they were called, would probably have amounted in the sum total, when I left there, to from a hundred and fifty to two hundred thousand people. Of course I can not tell exactly because I have not the figures to go by.
Senator BEVERIDGE. That is in your district?
General HUGHES. In Samar.
Senator BEVERIDGE. In Samar alone?
General HUGHES. Yes.
Senator BEVERIDGE. A hundred and fifty to two hundred thousand?
General HUGHES. Yes, somewhere along there. I have just made an estimate of it by taking the number of people reported. They were so scattered that no man by simply looking about would have known the number of people in the vicinity.
Senator BEVERIDGE. That would include most of the people of the island?
General HUGHES. We had the majority of the people of the island under our control and care. There is no doubt of that.
OCCUPATION OF SOUTHERN COAST OF SAMAR.
About the month of August the Ninth Infantry was sent down to Samar from Manila, where it had been on duty. I determined to occupy some of the south coast and stop the smuggling in of supplies. I sent these companies, one to Santa Rita, one to Basey, one to Balangiga, and one to Lanang, which is on the southeast coast.
NINTH INFANTRY WITH REDUCED COMPANIES.
I expected when I arranged for these assignments that the Ninth Infantry would come down with full companies, 140 men. They came down running in strength from 68 to about 80, I think, a little more than half companies. My expectation was to be able to occupy these stations and keep a mobile command from each command in the field in order to keep things in order. I had to give up the possibility of much work outside the occupation of the towns, because the companies were not strong enough. The only station that needs remark from me is that of Balangiga.
THE DISASTER AT BALANGIGA.
I left Samar on the 15th of September. The company had then been at Balangiga probably a month. I selected the officer by name for that station. I had known him from a second lieutenant—a strong, healthy, straight, zealous young officer. I sent for him personally and gave him a full account of the character of the people he was
going to be among, and all the information I thought he might need; not only what I gathered from the books about these people, who were given as heathen, but from my knowledge gained from persons then on the island. I sent him down there, and I had no more anxiety whatever about that station. I felt it was absolutely safe.
The fact has since developed, which I did not then know, that this officer had shown rather unusual confidence in the natives in Luzon. Of course I knew nothing of it at that time. On the morning of the 29th of September, just two weeks after I had left Samar and gone to Cebu, I was startled with a telegram of this disaster. I saw at once the danger, knowing the character of the people.
RELIEF MEASURES FOR BALANGIGA.
I first sent for the naval officer to see what could be done to caution the stations on the east coast, because they were growing more or less contemptuous of the enemy, owing to the absolute want of resistance; and I was afraid, in view of the fact that the Balangiga people were getting additional rifles and ammunition, that there would be further trouble.
The naval officer's vessel was not in condition to move, at least the one at Cebu, but there was a gunboat that had gone north for Laguan, on the east coast, which he thought I might catch at Calbayoc before it got away. I telegraphed Calbayoc and caught the vessel just as it had taken up anchor to go north. In five minutes it turned its course and went south.
INSTRUCTIONS TO NAVAL COMMANDER.
My instructions to the commander of the gunboat were to caution the posts on the east coast and to stand by off Pambujan until I sent troops to that station.
I wish to explain this in detail, for the simple reason that it is made the subject of a special text in the letter of Mr. Bonsal referred to yesterday. That station was one that I intended to be temporary. The fact of the Balangiga disaster changed my mind, and I would not have given it up under any circumstances if I had to change the men every four days, simply because it does not do to show any weakness to those people if you intend to control them.
SELECTION OF BALANGIGA.
The gunboat did stay at Pambujan until a strong company, 140 men of the Seventh Infantry, I think, was put in there, and then the detachment was relieved and taken away. But the responsibility for sending the special commander to Balangiga is all mine. I selected him by name from the officers on that particular ship coming down, as the best one, in my opinion, to go there. There was but one other captain on board the ship. He was a fine officer, but in bad health, and he died in Manila about two months afterwards. I had to give him sick leave. So far as that matter is concerned, that is my responsibility.
CAUSE OF DISASTER AT BALANGIGA.
There is no doubt whatever that the disaster was the result of overconfidence in the presidente and chief of police. That overconfidence
led to a want of precaution which under any other circumstances would have been taken.
The chief of police was allowed to arrest people throughout the country, reporting them as bad people, until he had arrested within a week before the disaster almost a hundred. After sending in the last batch, he reported that he would be in the next day with some 90 more, think. It is useless to say that the ones who came in the next morning did not go into the guardhouse.
The only rifle I could ascertain to be actually in condition for work at the time of the attack was in the hands of the sentinel at the guardhouse, and that rifle was seized by the chief of police when he gave the signal for the attack. So the company was caught absolutely unarmed at the time the attack was made, and the loss of life was in the struggle to get their arms. They got about 25 or 30 rifles, and drove the beggars out of town, but the officers had been assassinated in the convent, and there was nobody to lead the men. Their first sergeant had been killed, and I think the second sergeant; and they vacated the place.
RELIEF OF BALANGIGA.
On getting the report on the morning of the 29th, in addition to the precaution taken to warn others, I telegraphed to the commanding officer of Leyte—as you know, the strait is narrow between Leyte and Samar—to know what force he could get ready at once to send to Balangiga. He reported that he could send that day 125 men. He threw those men into Balangiga that evening. But in the first dispatch notifying me of the disaster Captain Bookmiller, of the Ninth Infantry, stationed at Basey, said that he would leave for Balangiga in an hour, or something of that kind, on the steam launch that that district had, with about 53, or some such number of men. He went down there. He landed and took possession. He buried the dead and did what could be done, and I think remained until the arrival of the stronger force from Leyte, which was to occupy it until the new troops came down.
That shows that notwithstanding the relief which came down from Luzon, of which Mr. Bonsal speaks, we were able to take care of ourselves, but it was decided to send quite a strong force at that time, and I think when the whole force came in they had about 5,000 on the island. I have not the figures, but I think the reports will show they increased the force to about 5,000 men.
In October the native scouts were changed somewhat in condition by transferring them from quartermaster's employees to the regular pay rolls of the Army. This required in the department quite a considerable reduction. We had between 1,800 and 2,000, and we were cut down, I think, to 1,300 or 1,400. I do not remember just what it was. The change was made without any bother. The men seemed to be perfectly satisfied in being discharged if we saw fit to discharge them. We consolidated the companies so far as we could and kept the best men. Everything was done with smoothness and without the least friction anywhere among the natives.
NATIVES AS SOLDIERS.
The CHAIRMAN. Do the natives make good soldiers?
General HUGHES. They have so far with us done exceedingly well. We had one slip at Bohol, which I have already mentioned, where, under the influence of a Tagalog leader, eight of them, I think, went out.
The CHAIRMAN. Is that a solitary instance?
General HUGHES. That is the only instance where any number went out. There was one man who deserted at Tigbauan, in Panay Province. I had the case gone into at once. I found that the lieutenant who enrolled him took him without examination, without inquiring of people who knew, simply because he was a fine-looking specimen. He stayed twenty-four hours, took 2 rifles, and cleared out. He was, in fact, an insurrecto.
The CHAIRMAN. Were the scouts that you enrolled down there Visayans?
General HUGHES. They were Visayans right through, and I was careful not to allow them to be given guns until they had been kept long enough to have absolutely committed themselves to us. Then they would be given a gun, probably just by a soldier when he was out; the native be allowed to carry it, and if he got an opportunity to do any firing he could do it.
It was worked gradually in that way, and before I came away I found the danger was that they would do too much shooting; that is, would kill more than was necessary. I found in the Samar business, where we had probably upward of a hundred of these scouts, that they were most excellent scouts, but that they were very apt to shoot when the Americans would not, and they sometimes, I think, shot longer than men should have shot under our system. It bad to be pretty carefully managed.
CONFLICT BETWEEN VISAYAN SOLDIERS AND INSURRECTOS.
But the only actual conflict that I over knew them to have with the insurrectos without white assistance was in Concepcion, where a section of them were out scouting and ran on to a superior number of insurrectos and their barracks and all that. They attacked it, drove out the insurrectos, and burned the place; but the officer acknowledged to me when be came in that it was pretty ticklish business for some time. They have to be led. They can not be commanded as you command white troops. If anything had happened to that officer, the thing would have been disastrous. So I never permitted it if I could prevent it. But sometimes people will get caught when they do not expect it.
NO MACABEBE SCOUTS IN SAMAR.
The CHAIRMAN. You had no Macabebe scouts down there?
General HUGHES. No; we had no Macabebes in our department.
The CHAIRMAN. You have described the campaign pretty fully. I think the committee would be glad to bear your opinion as to the general character of the Visayan people, among whom you were for so long a time; that is, in regard to their capacity for civil government or self-government, and what their feeling is generally.
General HUGHES. The Visayan people are not understood, and I do not pretend to understand them after living with them for two and a half years. There is very small per cent, and it is a very small per cent, of educated, fine people. In the towns, where these people are, there is another percentage, much larger, of people who have learned enough of good manners and good behavior to appear very well and to behave very well; but the great mass of the Visayan people to-day are absolutely ignorant. They have the general reputation of being a very gentle and pleasing people. That is certainly true; but I think that that is simply the passivity of indifference and ignorance. There is nothing that interests them. They will not be disturbed by anything that goes on around them.
A man will be killed in the street, as happened in Cebu, with 200 men around him, all within easy reach of him, and not one of them will turn even to draw the knife from the wound. That has happened. So I speak from fact. An army officer had to go quite a distance and draw the knife from the man who was killed, he said, almost in the presence of nearly 200 people in Cebu. It did not affect the natives who were going by. They affected to pay no attention to it.
NATURE OF IGNORANT VISAYANS.
I have here a memorandum of some other things which will show just the nature of these ignorant people in the district beyond the civilization with which they come in contact.
The first one I will mention happened at San Miguel, which you will find is a town within about 9 miles of Iloilo, Iloilo being the center of the intelligence of the island. If any gentleman wishes to see its location, I will show him where it is on the map.
A member of the Young Men's Christian Association and three soldiers of the Twenty-sixth Volunteers were going out to Leon.
They were attacked, two of the soldiers wounded and captured, and one of them made off with his gun and kept shooting. They caught him probably a couple of miles away from where the attack was made. That is, the insurrecto soldiers did not catch him, but the people of one of the barrios did. They eventually killed him, but before the man died, according to the evidence that was taken in preparation for the trial of his murderers, they made him eat rice mixed with carabao droppings, disfigured him, and, I understand partially dismembered him.
Senator RAWLINS. Was this wounded man an American or a native?
General HUGHES. The wounded men who were caught by the insurrecto officer, the command proper, were sent in. They sent in the two wounded men, delivered them, and released the member of the Christian Association.
The CHAIRMAN. They were all American soldiers, and not native soldiers?
General HUGHES. Do you mean these people?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
General HUGHES. They were American soldiers.
Senator RAWLINS. You stated that they had a trial, or that there was some evidence taken at the trial of somebody.
General HUGHES. No; it was evidence preparatory to trial. We afterwards got the facts, I think in another investigation, as to where this man had been caught and where he had been killed, and the judge-advocate took up the matter, I think, in a great deal of detail. He had the body disinterred to see—
Senator RAWLINS. What I am trying to get at is whether this man who was mutilated or disfigured was an American or native?
General HUGHES. As I said, he was a member of the Twenty-sixth United States Volunteers.
DEATH OF MEMBER OF NINETEENTH UNITED STATES INFANTRY.
There was a man of the Nineteenth United States Regulars who got outside of the lines about Iloilo, where he belonged, and was last heard of at Oton. He was supposed to have been after tuba, and got it, but the padre of Oton told me he saw him in that town. He never was heard of afterwards. There is no doubt about what occurred, but just how his death was brought about we do not know.
DISAPPEARANCE OF PRIVATE SHAW.
There was a man named Shaw, of the First Tennessee Volunteers, who was discharged at Iloilo. He opened a restaurant, I think. He went into some business in the town. Ho got a pass from the commanding officer at Molo to go out to buy chickens and eggs, I think, between the lines. The insurrectos caught him and took him to Santa Barbara, which was General Delgado's headquarters. While he stayed there (we heard from him from time to time) he was well cared for. He seemed to be enjoying himself. It might be stated that he had either married or taken as querida a native woman. We followed him, kept track of him, after we started out in November, as far as Lambunao.
The CHAIRMAN. This was in the early days?
General HUGHES. This was in 1899. At Lambunao he was assisting in dragging along a piece of artillery. He and some other prisoners were dragging it along. At Lambunao we lost track of him, and we never have heard of him since. Diligent inquiry did not disclose what had become of him. But we have no doubt what happened.
At Cabatuan the people induced a soldier to go out—
Senator CULBERSON. You say you have no doubt. You have no doubt of what?
Senator BEVERIDGE. No doubt as to what became of this man.
General HUGHES. Yes. I do not know where I used that term. I was thinking about something else, possibly.
Senator BEVERIDGE. You used it immediately after your statement as to when you last had heard of him.
General HUGHES. There is no doubt about the man being killed. That is what I meant.
Senator CULBERSON. So far as your inquiry related to his imprisonment, the last you heard of him was that he was being well treated; you stated that he was having a good time.
General HUGHES. Yes.
Senator CULBERSON. Now what is that—
General HUGHES. If you will permit me, the difference in conditions was this: General Delgado no longer had the man in his personal charge. In the attack we made on them they had to disperse more or less. By the time we got to Lambunao there was a good deal of evidence of demoralization or at least of hard pressure, because they were killing their carabaos because they were getting crazy from the heat and overwork.
The next day, after arriving at Lambunao, I took two battalions and made a double days' march and caught the enemy at Passi and scattered all that remained of their organization. But between Lambunao and Passi we lost track absolutely of this man. Calinog, the town between, has a bad reputation, as you will see as we go along.
Senator RAWLINS. This was in the vicinity of Iloilo?
General HUGHES. It is all in this little basin [indicating on map]. There is just a basin around under the hills, which is a rice growing and populous country.
Senator RAWLINS. In the vicinity of Iloilo?
General HUGHES. Yes, Sir, just around it.
ALLEGED ATTACK ON INHABITANTS BY AMERICANS.
Senator RAWLINS. I noticed a statement in regard to an attack made by an officer in the vicinity of Iloilo, in which some outrage had been committed and in which the entire inhabitants were surrounded by American troops and most of them killed. Perhaps you have heard of it. Do you know when that occurred, or if it did occur? I am inquiring for information.
General HUGHES. I do not know whether I caught your statement exactly. Will you please let it be read? So far as I understand your question I know nothing of the kind. But I should like to have it read again.
Senator RAWLINS. I will repeat it. I read a statement from some source, and I do not now recall what source, that immediately in the vicinity of Iloilo an officer, probably in a state of intoxication, who
was in command of some American troops, surrounded a number of native inhabitants and took the lives of practically all of them. I do not recall exactly when it is alleged to have occurred, but probably the latter part of 1899.
General HUGHES. I was away from Iloilo about fifty days in November and December. I do not think it is possible that anything---
Senator RAWLINS. Who was in command at Iloilo?
General Hughes. At first it was Lieutenant-Colonel Dickman of the Twenty-sixth, who will be here in a few days on the uniform board, which meets on Thursday. After this assault at Passi I sent Colonel Rice, the colonel of the Twenty-sixth, back to take charge of the whole province of Iloilo, while I went on with the rest of the field command to take possession of Capiz Province; and he was in command at Iloilo until my return, about the 1st of January. I am satisfied no such a thing could have occurred without my knowledge, and I have no knowledge of any such event occurring.
ENGAGEMENTS AROUND ILOILO.
Senator RAWLINS. Were there many engagements around in the vicinity of Iloilo after its capture originally by the American troops?
General HUGHES. As to actual engagements, there were very few. It was very hard to get an engagement of any kind. You could get what we would call a little skirmish, and probably there would be 10 or 12 killed.
THE CITY OF ILOILO.
Senator RAWLINS. Now, as I remember the course of events in Iloilo, the city was first held by the insurgents?
General HUGHES. It was first held by the Spaniards.
Senator RAWLINS. By the Spaniards, and then by the insurgents.
General HUGHES. It was deliberately turned over to the insurgents by General Rios.
Senator RAWLINS. And then captured by General Miller?
General HUGHES. And captured by General Miller and the Navy.
Senator RAWLINS. How long did General Miller remain in command?
General HUGHES. General Miller, I think, was in command a few days over a month.
Senator RAWLINS. Who succeeded him?
General HUGHES. I think Colonel Van Valzah had command for a short time, and then General Smith, being made a brigadier-general, had it probably for a month before I got there.
Senator RAWLINS. Did the respective commanders that you have named have their headquarters at Iloilo, or elsewhere?
General HUGHES. In Iloilo. It has always been the headquarters of that department, or district, as it was originally.
MUTILATION OF AN AMERICAN SOLDIER.
Senator RAWLINS. You speak about the mutilation of this soldier. It was committed by a mob of some two hundred people?
General HUGHES. That I do not know. I simply know it took place in a village community where there seemed to be quite a number present; how many, I do not think I ever inquired.
Senator RAWLINS. It was in the nature of a mob of people who happened to get hold of him?
General HUGHES. It was the people of that mountain village, right on the edge of the mountain, near Leon.
Senator RAWLINS. It followed after some difficulty; some fighting?
General HUGHES. The fight had been with the insurrecto solders. As I understand it, they were not the people who caught this one man who refused to surrender.
Senator RAWLINS. Of course you give it, as I understand you, as an illustration of the character of the Visayan people?
General HUGHES. Yes.
Senator RAWLINS. Would you think that the frenzied action of a mob would give any indication of what the people would do ordinarily?
General HUGHES. I am not sure.
Senator RAWLINS. I will ask you to answer that question if you can.
General HUGHES. I have not said that it was a mob.
Senator RAWLINS. I understood you to say that it was not done by insurrecto soldiers, but by the people.
General HUGHES. The people of the village.
Senator RAWLINS. You said there were about 200.
The CHAIRMAN. He did not say that.
Senator BEVERIDGE. Senator, you have two incidents mixed up, I think. He mentioned 200 people with reference to the murder in Cebu.
General HUGHES. Do not make a mistake. It was a man in the employ of Warner, Barnes & Co., as I recall it, who was killed right on the street with a knife.
Senator BEVERIDGE. It was in Cebu, at all events?
General HUGHES. It was only about 200 miles away from the place of the murder in question.
The CHAIRMAN. It had no connection with the soldiers.
Senator RAWLINS. You mentioned the number "200 people."
The CHAIRMAN. That was in connection with another case.
Senator BEVERIDGE. That was an assassination.
The CHAIRMAN. The assassination of a native 200 miles away.
General HUGHES. And on a different Island.
Senator RAWLINS. This case of mutilation was the subject of investigation by court-martial, was it not?
General HUGHES. I have been trying to recall whether the murderer who finally killed him was tried or not. I can not recall reviewing the case, which I would have done had the man been tried.
About the time that these investigations were made there was an escape of some prisoners from Leon, where this man was held during the investigation of the judge-advocate. I rather think that the man either escaped or was killed in trying to get away, for I can not recall that he was tried or that I reviewed the case, but I know we were trying to prepare the case and get the evidence ready for the purpose of trying him. But I can not determine whether or not I actually reviewed the case; I had to review a great many.
Senator RAWLINS. You were not present, of course, and you do not remember the details of the transaction?
General HUGHES. I only remember them as they were told me in a general way by the judge-advocate who was making the investigation and who came to me to have the body exhumed and all that sort of thing.
Senator RAWLINS. And the precise circumstances under which this mutilation occurred or the number of persons by whom it was inflicted you are not prepared to state, I understand?
General HUGHES. No, sir; except that it was done by the people of a certain neighborhood.
Senator RAWLINS. Only that it was done by the people of a certain neighborhood, but whether by insurrectos or whether by persons in the community suddenly frenzied, you are not prepared to say?
General HUGHES. No, sir.
Senator CULBERSON. You are certain it was not done by insurrecto soldiers?
General HUGHES. So far as I know, it was not, because the insurrecto soldiers with whom this affair occurred delivered their prisoners to our garrison and sent the Young Men's Christian Association man in without—
Senator CULBERSON. They saved him?
General HUGHES. Yes, sir.
Senator RAWLINS. Within your jurisdiction do you know of other instances of mutilation by the Visayans of American troops falling into their hands?
General HUGHES. I have some other cases here. Do you mean of natives against natives?
Senator RAWLINS. No; I mean the mutilation of American soldiers falling into the hands of native people.
General HUGHES. I do not know of any other mutilation unless you would call killing a man by crushing in his head with a stone mutilation.
Senator RAWLINS. That would be the act of killing, I suppose?
General HUGHES. Some were killed, but we do not know exactly how.
TREATMENT OF AMERICAN SOLDIERS BY VISAYANS
Senator RAWLINS. I suppose there were a number of American soldiers who fell into the hands of insurgents or insurrectos among the Visayans, were there not?
General HUGHES. Yes, sir.
Senator RAWLINS. Will you tell us, so far as you have knowledge upon the subject, how they were treated.
General HUGHES. That is what I was going on to do.
In Cabatuan, under the direction of the presidente and chief of police, a soldier of the Eighteenth Infantry was induced to go out to meet a woman of loose character. He did go out. They gave him tuba and proceeded to kill him with bolos and sent his gun to the insurrectos.
At Calinog the Twenty-sixth Infantry Volunteers, Captain Tutherly's company, had 4 men missing on taking up the march. I had left that battalion to escort the train while I moved with two battalions to Passi. They would make it a two days' march and I would make but one. Captain Tutherly, I think, sent back a corporal to find these men and bring them on. He found the people. He brought in one, but the others refused to come and he abandoned them.
I heard nothing of this until possibly five days later, but it was too late then to do anything. But we pursued the matter with the
idea of bringing the criminals to trial until after the establishment of the civil government.
The facts, when they finally came out, showed that these men had been full of tuba, and two of their guns had been taken from them, while the third one had kept his gun. They were just in such condition as to go back into Calinog, where they had camped, and demand these two guns of the people. I think the padre was one of the people to whom they spoke on the subject. The result of it was that they were all three killed by the people of that town.
Captain Tutherly was sent to Calinog when it became practicable to do so, and tried to find out the individuals who did it. They were people of that community, but he never was able to make a case. He is a lawyer of good repute in New Hampshire or Vermont—Vermont, I think—and he did his best to make a case, but all he could find was that they had been killed by the people of Calinog, the padre being present, I think.
From Pototan three men of the Eighteenth United States Infantry went to Barotac Nueva, some 5 or 6 miles distant, on a tuba hunting expedition. The information came from an old man of Spanish blood, I should imagine, from what they told me. I did not see him, although I was at Pototan at the time, but I did not know anything about the missing men at that time. I was preparing the command for crossing the mountain. This old man came in and notified those concerned that there was danger that these men would be gotten away with if they were not looked after. The captain of the company immediately sent a detachment. The men could not be found, and never have been found. The old man who brought in the evidence that they were there and would get into trouble had his head taken off.
The three soldiers, by common report, were taken down into the manglares between Barotac Nueva and Dumangas and boloed in the mud of this mangle, and of course the bodies would sink and disappear, and we have never been able to locate where they were killed. Some of the natives would show the spot where it occurred, but there was no longer any evidence on the surface.
One man of the Twenty-sixth United States Volunteers left his companions while across the Jalaur River from their camp one evening near Dingle. Diligent search was made for him the next morning, but he could not then be found and he never has been found.
In Cebu Captain Smith went on an expedition in the northern end of that island, and had five men either get lost or stray from his command. I have forgotten just the details of it. Two of them, we learned on good authority afterwards—because these cases were carefully looked into—were killed at a convent, I think, in Sogod. The other three were heard of as prisoners.
When the insurrectos came in in Cebu in October I asked Maxilom, the commanding officer of their forces in that island, before accepting his submission to the United States, for these three prisoners that his people had taken. He said he had no further information than the fact that when he heard of the capture he sent an order that these three men should be sent to him; that an officer was started to take them to his camp, and the men had never arrived there, and the officer was dead. So he knew nothing about it. That is all I could get.
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER TAGALO COMMANDERS
In Concepcion, commandancia of Iloilo, a man of the gunboat Concord was captured and duly returned.
Four men of the Eighteenth Infantry were captured near Jimino, in the province of Capiz. Three of them were returned alive at Calivo, one of them dead; that is, the body was returned. It was brought in at the same time. In both of these cases, the one in Concepcion and the one in Capiz, the enemy's forces were commanded by Tagalos and not by Visayans. That is the list of prisoners that they got on those islands.
AMERICAN PRISONERS IN LEYTE AND SAMAR.
In Leyte and Samar, where the statements are that the natives are very much worse, being Vicol or Tagalo chiefs, I think the prisoners have not in any case been killed. I do not know that Moxica, in Leyte, ever captured any of our men, but he did capture a lot of miners who came over there from Mindanao, and he duly tuned them over, with a very polite letter.
PRISONERS UNDER LUBKAN.
Lubkan's people did capture two soldiers, to my certain knowledge; in fact, they captured three; but one of them kept his gun and insisted upon resistance, and they killed him. The other two were sent to Lubkan and were well cared for and finally returned. This would seem to show that the Tagalos were the more civilized of the two peoples.
TREATMENT OF NATIVES BY NATIVES
The CHAIRMAN. How did they treat people of their own race who were friendly, or supposed to be friendly, to us!
General HUGHES. They were very apt, if it was a clear case, to take their heads off. Of course we did not investigate those cases where they occurred—
The CHAIRMAN. Cases of natives?
General HUGHES. Yes. We did not investigate unless they occurrred under our care. For instance, one case I remember came to me of which of course I had no investigation made because I did not propose to take any part in the matter.
ENGAGEMENT AT BALASAN.
I sent a command of the Twenty-sixth Volunteers to Carles, which is a point to the extreme north of Iloilo Province, to land there at night and by a swift march to reach Balasan, which is about ten miles distant, where they would find a band of insurgents. Captain Brownell had command. He did it, and he killed quite a number and took some prisoners, and got about twelve or fifteen stands of arms and generally demoralized that detachment of insurrectos.
The presidente of Carles having failed to notify the insurrectos of this landing of our people—not from any failure of effort, as I understand it, but his man did not get there soon enough—they took his head off and a good many cases of that kind have been reported. How many of them may be true and how many may not be true I could not tell.
VISAYANS' ATTITUDE TOWARD AMERICANS.
The CHAIRMAN. What is the attitude of the Visayans toward us now? I mean when you first went there as compared with when you came away.
General HUGHES. When I came away there was no trouble in going anywhere you pleased in Panay, in Negros, and in Cebu. Bohol had not yet turned in their arms, although a day for doing so had been arranged. In Leyte there were still some rifles out as I have previously said. While they did not attack at all, there would probably have been some risk in going about that island.
The CHAIRMAN. I mean what was the general attitude of the people?
General HUGHES. They were very friendly. They worked for us willingly and were always ready to do anything we wished.
VISAYANS' CAPACITY FOR CIVIL GOVERNMENT.
The CHAIRMAN. What do you think of their capacity for civil government?
General HUGHES. My personal opinion is that it will be a long time before they are qualified to run a civil government of their own. I understand your question to relate purely to the Visayans?
The CHAIRMAN. That is what I mean.
General HUGHES. I should say not inside of two generations. The people have no earthly idea of equity. They simply know their own wishes, and they have no regard for the wishes of others.
The CHAIRMAN. If left to themselves what sort of government, in your opinion, would they establish?
General HUGHES. They would try, undoubtedly, to establish a republic of some kind, and they would do it. The ordinary Tao of the Visayans is one of the most gullible creatures the world contains. He will believe anything he is told by his acknowledged superior, no difference how absurd the statement is, and there is the great Strength that their leaders have over them—the enormous lies that are published to them as to their plans and what is going to take place. They gull them right along.
The latest I got hold of from Lukban to his people was that a German fleet would be in those waters at such a date to blow the Americans out, and that they would then secure their independence. That was the last one I heard.
VISAYAN CONCEPTION OF INDEPENDENCE.
Senator CULBERSON. Do you mean by that to suggest that the Visayans desire independence?
General HUGHES. These people of whom I speak, the Taos, do not know what independence means. They probably think it is something to eat. They have no more idea what it means than a shepherd dog.
Senator CULBERSON. How could this proclamation have such a wonderful effect on them as you describe if they do not know what it means?
General HUGHES. Simply because they want to get rid of the Americans.
Senator CULBERBON. They do?
General HUGHES. Yes, sir.
Senator CULBERSON. They want independence so far as the Americans are concerned?
General HUGHES. They want us driven out, so that they can have this independence, but they do not know what it is.
FEELING OF VISAYANS TOWARD THE UNITED STATES.
The CHAIRMAN. Are they pretty generally hostile, or are there among them many friendly to us?
General HUGHES. You will find a very great deal of good will in all the provinces where absolute peace has been established.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you think if they were left to themselves they would submit to a Tagalo government in Luzon?
General HUGHES. I think probably they would submit for a while, until some of their leaders did not get what they wanted. Then they would probably take the course as to which one of their great advocates remarked on one occasion. They were discussing what could be done as a republic, and he and his friends had their ideas, and they said they would do so and so. A man who was discussing the matter with them suggested that there might be a good deal of opposition to that. "No," said he, "if anybody opposes it we will take off his head. That is all."
The CHAIRMAN. You think the tendency would be to break up into separate republics?
General HUGHES. I do not think it would live long enough to break up into different republics. I think the islands would be taken possession of by somebody else.
The CHAIRMAN. You think the islands would be taken possession of by some other power?
General HUGHES. Yes, sir.
At 12 o'clock meridian the committee adjourned until to-morrow, Wednesday, March 5, 1902, at 10.30 o'clock a. m.